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Abstract: 
To improve our understanding of the role that universities play in facilitating the transmission of 
knowledge to private-sector business enterprises so as to generate economic growth, this article 
builds on the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship to develop a formal model of 
university-with-business enterprise collaborative research partnerships in which the outcome is 
both mutually desirable and feasible. This model shows that if a university seeks to act as a 
complement to private-sector collaborative R&D so that it will be attractive to both incumbent 
firms and startup entrepreneurs, it needs to structure its program so that business enterprise 
revenues increase and business enterprise R&D costs rise by a smaller proportion than revenues 
increase, if they rise at all (and a fall would be better). Such a structure is consistent with both 
business enterprise and university interests, but is only likely to be feasible if the university is 
subsidized to cover the cost of such public-private collaborative research partnerships. In the 
absence of such support, the university will have to cover its costs through a fee charged to 
participating business enterprises and that will result in the university being seen as a substitute 
rather than a complement to private-sector collaborative R&D, and thus the university will be 
seen as an unattractive partner for many business enterprises. 
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1 Introduction 
Endogenous growth models have long recognized the connection between knowledge spillovers 
and growth. However, as Acs et al. (2009) and Braunerhjelm et al. (2010) note in their 
Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship (KSTE), such spillovers do not generate 
growth of their own accord. Rather, such spillovers must be transmitted through entrepreneurial 
actions. Thus, economic growth requires a balance between research and entrepreneurial activity 
(Michelacci 2003) that is actuated by a matching process similar to that observed in labor 
markets (Pissarides 1990).1 
This article investigates the role that a university plays in determining that balance through such 
arrangements as research joint ventures, consortia, and research parks.2 Empirical evidence, both 
anecdotal (Babbage 2011) and more formally derived (Audretsch and Lehmann 2005; 
Tassey 2008; Link and Welsh 2013), suggests that universities may play a significant role in the 
process by which knowledge is transformed into economic knowledge and that this process takes 
place at a local or regional level.3 And, certainly in the USA, industry/university relationships, 
either formal as a research joint venture4 or informal as a member of a consortium or a resident 
of a university research park,5 have been increasing since the early 1980s. This trend is likely a 
result of both a university response to incentives established through, for example, the Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980 and a response by industry to the productivity slowdown during the late 1970s 
and the realization that technology life cycles are shortening.6 
Nearly a decade ago, Hall et al. (2000, 2003) wrote that little is known about the types of roles 
that universities play in general in such research partnerships or about the economic 
consequences associated with those roles, and little has changed since then.7 What research there 
is on the topic of universities as research partners focuses solely on industry motivations or on 
university motivations for engaging in an industry/university research relationship, but not on 
how the two sides interact. We know that industry has many motivations for partnering with 
universities, only one of which is to gain first access to complementary research activity and 
research results,8 and that universities’ motivation is to relieve administration-based financial 
pressures by incentivizing faculty to engage in applied commercial research with industry.9 To 
our knowledge, no previous studies have attempted to formalize, mathematically, the relationship 
between the two parties.10 
Intriguingly, however, the KSTE (see, for example, Audretsch and Lehmann 2005) 
characterization of business enterprises firms or startup entrepreneurs suggests that how firms 
interact with universities may be at least in part dependent on whether the business enterprise is a 
firm or an entrepreneur. 
There is thus a need for a broader framework that jointly accounts for the motivations of both 
universities and the two types of business enterprises when assessing the benefits and costs to 
collaboration and predicting the situations under which collaboration will be mutually beneficial. 
Absent this broader framework, responses to naïve policy prescriptions might be costly and 
unproductive. Acs et al. (2009, p. 28), for example, note the “need to explain where 
[entrepreneurial] opportunities come from, [and] how intra-temporal knowledge spillovers 
occur,” and the State Science and Technology Institute (SSTI) recently proclaimed (2008, p. 13): 
Innovation, in and of itself, will not necessarily translate into economic activity. Rather, it is the 
application of that technology and its introduction into the marketplace that results in economic 
growth. Having a strong R&D base is necessary but not sufficient to grow a technology-based 
economy. An effective means of moving technology into the commercial marketplace is to 
encourage relationships between the researchers who are making the discoveries and the 
entrepreneurs and companies that have the ability to commercialize them [emphasis added]. 
As we demonstrate in this article, it is only under a specific set of cost and profit conditions 
based on the interplay of university and business enterprise behaviors, which we refer to as 
collective entrepreneurship, that university-with-business enterprise partnerships are beneficial to 
both parties and therefore likely to occur.11, 12 
The remainder of this article is outlined as follows. In Sect. 2 we examine the decision by 
private-sector business enterprises (that is, both KSTE firms and entrepreneurs)13 to collaborate 
with other private-sector business enterprises. In that decision-making process, business 
enterprises have to balance the increased potential for revenues that comes with greater 
collaboration with both the decreased ability to appropriate those potential revenues and the 
increased cost of engaging in R&D that also come with greater collaboration. Then, in Sect. 3, 
we turn to the possibility that a business enterprise could engage in collaborative R&D with a 
university, and if it does, whether it will view the university as a complement to private-sector 
collaborative R&D, in which case it will increase that activity, or as a substitute, in which case it 
will reduce that private-sector collaborative activity. With Sect. 3 as background, 
Sect. 4 examines the policy alternatives for the university and the implications of its choices for 
the level and type of collaborative R&D that occurs as a result and the dependency of that choice 
on its own motivations and constraints. Being an initial theoretical exploration of what we refer 
to as collective entrepreneurship, we have relied on a number of simplifying assumptions, such 
as only focusing on cost and profit conditions. As we note below, we are aware of these 
modeling simplifications, and we expect that others will build upon our effort to address them in 
future analyses. Section 5 considers the normative implications of the model. Finally, 
Sect.6 concludes the article with a brief summary and discussion of the implications of this work 
for future research. 
2 Private-sector collaboration 
Consider a geographic region in which N heterogeneous profit-maximizing, private-sector 
business enterprises engage in R&D in collaboration with other business enterprises and use the 
results of that R&D to produce and sell product. Assume that each business enterprise in the 
region seeks to maximize its profitπ associated with R&D,14 and, following the KSTE, let the 
impact of that R&D be the result of the business enterprise’s status as an incumbent firm or 
startup entrepreneur, its ability σ to efficiently transform knowledge into economic (that is, 
commercially viable) knowledge, and the synergies it experiences that are associated with 
interacting with some n number of other business enterprises (n < N) in the region. 
The revenue r associated with conducting such R&D will depend on the amount of the R&D, on 
its ability σto transform the results of that R&D into economic knowledge, and on the degree to 
which the business enterprise can appropriate the value of the economic knowledge that it 
generates. Let p represent the potential revenue that could be earned by the firm were it not 
subject to competition from any other business enterprise in the region, and assume that p is an 
increasing function of σ (which lies between 0 and 1) and an increasing, concave function of n 15: 
 (1) 
p is an increasing function of σ because a higher σ indicates that the enterprise has generated a 
greater level of economically usable knowledge.16 p is an increasing function of n because of the 
economies of technological scope that come from interacting with a larger number of business 
enterprises and a concave function of n because the business enterprise faces downward sloping 
demand curves in its product markets that results in revenues rising at a diminishing rate as the 
number of firms it collaborates with, and hence the research output of the business enterprise, 
increases. 
The actual revenue r that a firm can earn is typically less than its potential revenue p because the 
business enterprise is unlikely to be able to appropriate the full amount of p in the marketplace. 
While a number of factors affect the ability of a business enterprise to appropriate p, an increase 
in n will in general reduce the ability of the business enterprise to appropriate p because (1) an 
increase in n increases the probability that among the business enterprise’s collaborators will be 
some of the business enterprises with which it competes, and (2) an increase in n reduces the 
time it takes before the knowledge spreads to non-collaborating, competitor business enterprises 
that are located in the region.17 Thus, letting a be the proportion of p that the business enterprise 
can actually appropriate, we can describe the determination of a as: 
 (2) 
Hence, the actual revenues r of the business enterprise can be defined as: 
r=r(σ,n)=a(n)⋅p(σ,n). (3) 
Finally, there are the costs c that the business enterprise incurs when it engages in R&D. We 
assume that such costs increase at an increasing rate with n for two reasons. First, with an 
increase in n, we would expect to see an increase in the scale of R&D activity. While there may 
be some scale economies at first, ultimately, diminishing returns are likely to be present. Second, 
as n increases, so will the likelihood that some of those n partners may attempt to manipulate the 
activities of the group for their own private benefit or even to free ride, and that will drive up the 
business enterprise’s cost of maintaining and monitoring its partnerships in order to protect itself 
against such activities. Thus: 
 (4) 
The profits of the business enterprise will therefore be the difference between the actual 
revenue rassociated with the appropriable amount of the business enterprise’s research and the 
cost c of that business enterprise engaging in the R&D process: 
π=π(σ,n)=r(σ,n)−c(n). (5) 
The optimal number n* of collaborators for the business enterprise will then be that number of 
business enterprises that sets marginal profits to zero: 
 (6) 
such that: 
π∗=π(σ,n∗)≥0 (7) 
Note that the business enterprise’s marginal revenue, ∂r(σ,n∗)∂n, is the result of changes in both 
potential revenue p(σ, n) and the level of appropriability a(n): 
 (8) 
and the business enterprise’s marginal cost is dc(n∗)dn. Figure 1 illustrates the partnership 
problem for a given business enterprise with a given σ. In the top diagram, the problem is 
illustrated in terms of total values with the profit-maximizing number of R&D partners n* being 
where total profits are greatest. Total profits π(σ, n)are maximized where the slopes of the 
revenue curve r(σ, n) and the cost curve c(n) are the same. In the bottom diagram, the same 
problem is illustrated in terms of marginal values. Thus, the profit-maximizing number of R&D 
partners n * is located where the marginal revenue (mr) intersects the marginal cost (mc) curve, 
and the greater σ is, ceteris paribus, the greater will be n*. 
 
Fig. 1 Private-sector business enterprise collaboration 
The logic of this problem is the same for all business enterprises. However, as the KSTE notes, 
there is a significant difference between incumbent firms and startup entrepreneurs, and this 
difference results in incumbent firms generally preferring a higher number of R&D partners than 
will startup entrepreneurs. Incumbent firms engage in R&D to generate marginal improvements 
in knowledge that they can exploit; startup entrepreneurs are typically individuals who only 
recently exited from an incumbent firm and whose focus is on the exploitation of the total 
knowledge set that they have taken from incumbent firms. Collaborative R&D among business 
enterprises focuses on marginal increases in knowledge that is not likely to significantly change 
the total store of knowledge. As a result, incumbent firms are more likely to have the institutional 
infrastructure and the volume of trade to exploit such marginal increases in knowledge, while 
startup entrepreneurs are not. Moreover, startup entrepreneurs are more likely to perceive the 
loss of appropriation associated with having R&D partners to be a greater threat than will 
incumbent firms both because the entrepreneurs are more susceptible to such risks and because 
they are unlikely to have the infrastructure and negotiating leverage to protect themselves from 
such loss of appropriation. Thus, despite the fact that startup entrepreneurs generally have 
greater σ than incumbent firms, they will have lower revenue functions r(σ. n) that decline more 
quickly as the number of R&D partners increases. Hence, their marginal revenue curves will be 
lower, and they will prefer a smaller number of private-sector R&D partners. 
3 Business enterprise demand for university collaboration 
For the private-sector business enterprise, whether incumbent firm or startup entrepreneur, the 
decision to collaborate with a university ultimately depends on whether profits are higher or 
lower as a result of that collaboration. However, whether the business enterprise collaborates, 
and if so whether it views such collaboration as a substitute or a complement for private-sector 
collaboration, will depend not only on whether profits increase, but also on the relative change in 
the business enterprise’s R&D costs and revenues that come about as a result of collaborating 
with a university. 
3.1 Which business enterprises will collaborate with the university? 
A university as a research partner can affect a business enterprise’s profits in three ways: It can 
(1) increase the business enterprise’s economies of technological scope, (2) reduce the business 
enterprise’s ability to appropriate potential revenues, and (3) change the business enterprise’s 
cost of engaging in R&D. 
Collaboration with a university creates economies of technological scope. At a minimum, the 
university may be thought of as simply another collaborating business enterprise in the region. 
Thus, the university, like any business enterprise, creates the possibility of more interactions and 
more access to research capital and other knowledge spillovers, and this, in turn, gives the 
business enterprise in general the opportunity to increase its revenue stream. Interestingly, 
however, the startup entrepreneur in this regard will view the university as a somewhat safer 
partner to the extent the university is perceived as less of a competitive threat. 
But of course, the university is more than just another collaborating business enterprise; it also 
embodies unique human and technical capital that might not be available in the private sector or, 
if available, for which the acquisition cost might be higher.18 The university makes such unique 
capital available to the business enterprises with which it collaborates, thereby increasing for 
those business enterprises the research synergies that come from being able to explore a broader 
spectrum of research issues and from being able to view research questions from a different 
perspective. Particularly for startup entrepreneurs whose stock of human and especially physical 
capital is likely to be low compared to incumbent firms, this benefit is potentially of great 
significance. The university also may act as a facilitator of (potential or additional) synergies 
among the business enterprises themselves. By providing physical facilities for collaborations 
(e.g., meetings) and joint research, by sponsoring seminars, conferences, workshops, receptions, 
and by generally acting as matchmaker and objective chaperone, the university can thereby 
increase the quality of interactions among those business enterprises.19 But as noted in the 
previous section, while this may be of benefit to startup entrepreneurs, particularly if it provides 
those enterprises with a safer environment in which to develop trust with other private-sector 
enterprises, it nonetheless also contains the potential risk of an increased loss of appropriation. 
On the whole, then, the university affords business enterprises with some ability to earn greater 
revenue from both their direct interaction with the university and the increased value of their 
collaboration with other business enterprises. In terms of our model, these effects increase the 
marginal value of potential revenue, , for each participating business enterprise. Assume, 
then, that potential revenue p(σ, n) and its marginal value  both change by the 
parameter ω ≥ 1 (shown below) as a result of these economies of technological scope. 
The presence of the university also reduces the ability of collaborating business enterprises to 
appropriate the output of their shared research for private gain. The reward structure for 
researchers in a university is primarily based on publications (Link 1996). As a result, there will 
be limited interest on the part of university researchers to collaborate with business enterprises if 
they cannot use such collaboration to generate publications. Moreover, because university 
missions typically include providing general benefits to society in the form of increased 
knowledge, they tend to focus more on basic research than do business enterprises, and the 
commercial value of basic research is by its nature more difficult to appropriate. For these 
reasons, the presence of the university reduces the ability of business enterprises to appropriate 
the increased potential revenue that those business enterprises get from collaborating with the 
university and with other business enterprises. In terms of our model, these effects decrease the 
marginal degree of appropriability, , for each participating business enterprise. Assume, 
then, that the degree of appropriability a(n) and its marginal value  both change by the 
parameter α ≤ 1 as a result of these effects. As suggested above, this is more likely to be a 
significant issue for the startup entrepreneur. 
Finally, collaboration with a university will affect a business enterprise’s cost of undertaking 
R&D, although the direction of change is not clear. On the one hand, the presence of the 
university might be expected to reduce the business enterprise’s R&D costs because (1) the 
university may not require full compensation for the R&D production costs it incurs as a 
collaborator owing to the infrastructural nature of university research, (2) the university in its 
role as an “honest broker” can reduce various monitoring and transaction costs incurred by the 
business enterprises with whom it collaborates and thereby reduce the chance of the R&D 
process being manipulated to the benefit of a subset of collaborating business enterprises, and (3) 
the university may cover the cost of interactions among business enterprises by providing 
physical facilities for meetings and joint research as well as sponsoring seminars, conferences, 
workshops, and receptions. On the other hand, a business enterprise’s R&D cost may rise as a 
result of collaborating with the university because of the additional costs associated with 
university requirements (including a possible fee) or with added lobbying and reporting costs 
associated with participating in a bureaucratic or political process.20Assume, then, that as a result 
of these factors, the business enterprise’s R&D costs c(n) and its marginal value dc(n)dn both 
change by the parameter κ>0 (shown below). Because of the smaller typical size of a startup 
entrepreneur, these factors, whether positive or negative, are likely to weigh more heavily with 
the entrepreneur. 
Given the above changes associated with university collaboration, the profits to the collaborating 
business enterprise in interacting with a university can be represented by: 
πU=πU(σ,n)=α⋅a(n)⋅ω⋅p(σ,n)−κ⋅c(n)∋0<α≤1,ω≥1,andκ>0. (9) 
The optimal number nU∗ of collaborators for the business enterprise will then be that number of 
business enterprises that sets marginal profits to zero: 
 (10) 
where the business enterprise’s marginal revenue ∂rU(σ,n)∂n is αω times the business 
enterprise’s marginal revenue in the absence of university collaboration (see Eq. (8)): 
 (11) 
and the business enterprise’s marginal R&D cost dcU(nU∗)dn is κ times the business enterprise’s 
marginal R&D cost in the absence of university collaboration: 
 (12) 
The question of whether a business enterprise chooses to collaborate with the university hinges 
on whether its profits in the absence of the university π * are greater or less than the business 
enterprise’s profits with the university πU∗. Using Eqs. (5) and (9), that condition can be 
describe as: 
πU∗≷π∗if(δrαω−1)⋅a(n∗)⋅p(σ,n∗)≷(δcκ−1)⋅c(n∗) (13) 
where δ r indicates the ratio of revenue in the absence of university collaboration 
with nU∗ versus the revenue associated with the number of collaborators n * in the absence of 
university collaboration, and δ cindicates the same ratio with respect to the business enterprise’s 
costs: 
 (14) 
 (15) 
The values of δ r and δ c indicate the impact on revenues and costs of the business enterprise 
choosing to change the number of private-sector collaborators as a result of the collaboration 
with the university. If nU∗>n∗, then δ r  > δ c  > 1. If nU∗<n∗, then δ c  < δ r  < 1. And 
if nU∗=n∗, then δ r  = δ c  = 1. 
To determine which business enterprises will choose to collaborate with the university, consider 
the four ways (summarized in Fig. 2) in which the business enterprise’s R&D costs and revenues 
can change as a result of such collaboration:21 
 
Fig. 2 Effect of university collaboration on revenues and R&D costs 
Case 1—revenues and R&D costs both rise 
Revenues and R&D costs will both rise if δrαω>1 and δcκ>1. Because of that, we can rewrite 
Eq. (13) as: 
 (16) 
and note that the final ratio is the elasticity of the business enterprise’s R&D costs with respect to 
revenues associated with collaborating with the university:22 
 (17) 
Because the firm’s revenue-cost ratio   ≥1, all business enterprises will choose to 
collaborate with the university if E c,r  < 1, that is, if the proportional increase in revenues 
exceeds the proportional increase in R&D costs. However, if E c,r  ≥ 1, the decision to 
collaborate with the university will depend on whether the business enterprise’s revenue-cost 
ratio  exceeds E c,r . The convexity assumptions of our model imply that the 
revenue-cost ratio is a declining function of n. Hence, if n is sufficiently small, the revenue-cost 
ratio will be greater than Ec,r, and the business enterprise will choose to collaborate with the 
university; if n is sufficiently large, the revenue-cost ratio will be less than Ec,r, and the business 
enterprise will choose not to collaborate with the university. Thus, startup entrepreneurs, who are 
relatively inactive in collaborating with other business enterprises, are more likely to find 
university collaboration attractive in this case than will incumbent firms. Figure 3 illustrates this 
conclusion with n∗ˆindicating the level of n * at which a business enterprise would be indifferent 
between collaborating and not collaborating with the university. 
 
Fig. 3 R&D collaboration with the university when revenues rise proportionately less than R&D 
costs rise 
Case 2—revenues and R&D costs both fall 
Because revenues and R&D costs will both fall if δrαω<1 and δcκ<1, we can rewrite equation 
(13) as (note the reversal of the inequality sign in the conditional inequality due to δrαω−1 being 
negative): 
 (18) 
Because the business enterprise’s revenue-cost ratio   ≥1, no business enterprise will 
choose to collaborate with the university if E c,r  < 1, that is, if the proportional fall in revenues 
exceeds the proportional fall in R&D costs. However, if E c,r  ≥ 1, the decision to collaborate 
with the university will depend on whether the business enterprise’s revenue-cost 
ratio  exceeds E c,r . Because revenue-cost ratio is a declining function of n, if n is 
sufficiently small, the revenue-cost ratio will be greater than Ec,r, and the business enterprise 
will choose not to collaborate with the university. Likewise, if n is sufficiently large, the 
revenue-cost ratio will be less than Ec,r, and the business enterprise will choose to collaborate 
with the university. Thus, incumbent firms, which are relatively active in collaborating with 
other business enterprises, are more likely to find university collaboration attractive in this case 
than will startup entrepreneurs. 
Figure 4 illustrates this conclusion with n∗ˆ indicating the level of n * at which a business 
enterprise would be indifferent between collaborating and not collaborating with the university. 
 
Fig. 4 R&D collaboration with the university when revenues fall proportionately less than R&D 
costs fall 
Case 3—revenues rise but R&D costs do not, or R&D costs fall but revenues do not 
Revenues and R&D costs will change in opposite directions with revenues rising but R&D costs 
not rising (or with R&D costs falling but revenues not falling) if δrαω≥1, δcκ≤1, and one of 
these conditions holds as a strict inequality. If the first inequality holds as a strict inequality, the 
effect of increased economies of scope will outweigh the effect of a loss in appropriability. As a 
result, revenues will rise, and all business enterprises regardless of the degree to which they 
collaborate with other firms will choose to collaborate with the university. Similarly, if the 
second inequality holds as a strict inequality, then R&D costs will fall, revenues will not, and all 
business enterprises will choose to collaborate with the university. 
Case 4—Revenues fall but R&D costs do not, or R&D costs rise but revenues do not 
The final possible case is that revenues fall but R&D costs do not (or R&D costs rise but 
revenues do not), which will occur if δrαω≤1, δcκ≥1, and one of these conditions holds as a strict 
inequality. If the first inequality holds as a strict inequality, the effect of a loss in appropriability 
will outweigh the effect of increased economies of scope. As a result, revenues will fall, R&D 
costs will at best stay the same, and hence no business enterprise regardless of the degree to 
which they collaborate with other business enterprises will choose to collaborate with the 
university. Similarly, if the second inequality holds as a strict inequality, then R&D costs will 
rise, revenues at best will stay the same, and once again no business enterprise will choose to 
collaborate with the university. 
Summarizing these four cases, then, no business enterprise will collaborate with the university if 
its revenues fall and R&D costs rise, or if its revenues fall but its R&D costs fall by a smaller 
proportion. If revenues and R&D costs rise, but R&D costs rise by a greater proportion, only 
business enterprises that have relatively few private-sector collaborators (particularly startup 
entrepreneurs) will choose to engage in university collaboration. And if R&D costs fall but 
revenues fall by a smaller proportion, only business enterprises that have a relatively large 
number of private-sector collaborators (particularly incumbent firms) will choose to engage in 
university collaboration. Finally, if revenues increase and R&D costs decrease, all business 
enterprises will choose to collaborate with the university. Figure 5 provides a summary of these 
results. 
 
Fig. 5 Which business enterprises collaborate with university? 
3.2 Is university collaboration a complement or substitute for private-sector business enterprise 
collaboration? 
The presumed purpose of universities engaging in R&D with private-sector business enterprises 
is not simply to assist those firms with current R&D projects but to increase the level of 
collaborative R&D among private-sector business enterprises more generally so as to create a 
more active R&D culture in the regional economy that results in greater regional economic 
growth through the appropriation and transformation of knowledge into economic knowledge. 
Thus, the presumed purpose of universities is to increase the efficiency with which business 
enterprises convert knowledge to economic knowledge. 
An important question, therefore, is whether the firms that choose to engage in collaborate R&D 
with the university treat that collaboration as a substitute or as a complement to private-sector 
collaborative R&D. In terms of our model, this question turns on whether the firms that engage 
in collaborative R&D with the university increase or decrease as a result the number of private-
sector R&D partners, that is, whether nU∗is greater or smaller than n * . 
To answer that question, recall the first-order conditions [Eq. (10)] for the business enterprise 
that collaborates with the university. That first-order condition states that the business 
enterprise’s marginal revenue with nU∗ private-sector R&D partners should be equal to the 
business enterprise’s marginal R&D cost associated with nU∗. Using Eqs. (11) and (12), we can 
express this requirement as: 
 (19) 
To understand the implications of Eq. (19), recall the first-order conditions [Eq. (6)] for private-
sector business enterprise collaboration: 
 (20) 
If as a result of university collaboration the business enterprise’s marginal revenue and marginal 
R&D cost functions change by the same proportion (that is, if αω=κ), then Eq. (20) tells us that 
Eq. (19) will be satisfied with nU∗=n∗. However, if the marginal revenue function rises by a 
greater proportion than the marginal R&D cost function or falls by a smaller proportion (that 
is, αω>κ), Eq. (19) requires a lower value for  and/or a higher value for , and 
given the concavity of the revenue function and the convexity of the R&D cost function, this will 
occur with a value of nU∗ that is greater than n∗. Finally, if the marginal revenue function rises 
by a smaller proportion as the R&D cost function or falls by a greater proportion (that is, κ>αω), 
then Eq. (19) requires that nU∗<n∗. Thus, university collaboration can be either a substitute or a 
complement to private-sector collaboration, depending on whether the revenues of the business 
enterprise change proportionately more or less than does that same business enterprise’s R&D 
costs. Figures 6, 7, and 8 illustrate the dynamics that generate these outcomes, and 
Fig. 9 summarizes these results in the same change in revenues × change in R&D costs policy 
space that we used to summarize whether a firm will choose to collaborate with the university.23 
 
Fig. 6 Changes in the ideal number of private-sector R&D partners when university collaboration 
results in a rise in marginal revenue and marginal R&D cost 
 
Fig. 7 Changes in the ideal number of private-sector R&D partners when university collaboration 
results in a fall in marginal revenue and marginal R&D cost 
 
Fig. 8 Changes in the ideal number of private-sector R&D partners when university collaboration 
results in marginal revenue and marginal R&D cost changing in opposite directions 
 
Fig. 9 Effects of university R&D collaboration on private-sector R&D collaboration 
3.3 Overall results 
Figure 10 provides an overall summary of the results of the behavior of business enterprises that 
are offered the opportunity to collaborate with the university. The incentive to collaborate with 
the university depends on how R&D costs and revenues change: 
 
Fig. 10 Business enterprise demand for university collaboration-summary 
• If collaboration with the university results in revenues rising and R&D costs falling, 
revenues rising proportionately more than R&D costs rise, or revenues falling 
proportionately less than R&D costs fall, then business enterprises that are relatively 
more active in private-sector R&D collaborative activity (particularly incumbent firms) 
will choose to collaborate with the university. 
• If collaboration with the university results in higher revenues, then firms that are 
relatively less active in private-sector R&D collaborative activity (particularly startup 
entrepreneurs) will choose to collaborate with the university. 
For those business enterprises that choose to collaborate with the university, whether those 
business enterprises treat the university as a substitute or complement to private-sector 
collaboration will depend on the relative change in R&D costs versus revenues: 
• If R&D costs rise proportionately more than revenues rise, university collaboration will 
be a substitute for private-sector R&D collaboration and the number of private-sector 
R&D collaborators will fall. 
• If revenues rise and R&D costs fall, or rise proportionately more than R&D costs rise, or 
fall proportionately less than R&D costs do, university collaboration will be a 
complement for private-sector R&D collaboration and the number of private-sector R&D 
collaborators will rise. 
4 University supply of collaboration 
The degree to which business enterprises collaborate with the university and the effect of that 
collaboration on the level of private-sector collaboration will depend not just on the business 
enterprises but on the choices that the university makes regarding the collaborative R&D 
program it establishes. And those choices depend in turn on the objectives of the university, the 
cost of delivering that program, and how that program is paid for. 
4.1 The university’s cost function 
Consider first the R&D cost function for the university. As noted above, the university increases 
the profits of a collaborating business enterprise by providing some combination of enhanced 
economies of technological scope and possible reduced costs that is sufficient to overcome any 
loss in appropriability and possible increased costs. If we assume that the cost of providing 
enhanced economies of technological scope rises at an increasing rate, and that the cost of 
providing reduced R&D costs to a collaborating business enterprise rises in the same manner, 
then the university’s cost function can be characterized as: 
 (21) 
such that: 
cU(1,1)=0. (22) 
Note that implicit in Eqs. (21) and (22) is the assumption that the level of diminished 
appropriability, that is, the value of α, is exogenous at some value α 0  < 1 and imposes no cost 
on the university. We will examine this assumption later. 
The university’s policy options implied by this university cost function can be described using a 
set of iso-cost curves, beginning with the iso-cost curve associated with a minimal program 
characterized by Eq. (22), that is, a program of no net cost to the university and in which there 
are no enhanced economies of scope and no change in the R&D cost function for participating 
business enterprises. That program is illustrated in Fig. 11 by the point A and is associated with 
the iso-cost curve B 0 .24 Note that because of the convexity of the university’s cost function c U , 
this zero-cost iso-cost line will cross the δrαω−1=0 line at some pointD where δcκ−1>0. 
Whether it comes in contact with the nU∗=n∗ line (where α ω = κ) is an empirical question. If it 
does, it will be at a value of  and a value of κ>1, thus requiring (in a loose sense) that the 
cost to the university of increasing the firm’s economies of scope rises more slowly than does the 
cost to the university of reducing the firm’s R&D cost function. Figure 11 is drawn assuming 
that this latter condition is not the case. 
 
Fig. 11 University supply of collaboration 
The iso-cost curve for a university program that reduces a participating business enterprise’s 
R&D cost function (that is, κ < 1) and/or increases expected revenue (that is, ω > 1) will lie to 
the southeast of the iso-cost curve B 0 . Thus, the iso-budget curves B 1 and B 2 in 
Fig. 11 represent programs that result in positive net costs to the university with the cost 
associated with B 2 being greater than the cost associated with B 1 . 
4.2 The university’s objective 
What option the university chooses will depend on the university’s objective and what funding 
arrangements exist. Coates and Humphreys (2002) and Coates et al. (2004) argue that university 
motivations are bureaucratic with the essential question being whether they are slack-
maximizing (which is akin to profit-maximizing) versus budget maximizing. 
If universities are slack-maximizing, they would prefer programs to the northwest of the iso-cost 
curve B 0 in Fig. 11, that is, programs located in Region 3 that involve firms that are relatively 
inactive in private-sector collaborative R&D with other business enterprises. In such a case, 
while the program would enhance the revenue potential for participating business enterprises, it 
also would essentially charge participating business enterprises a price (that is, κ would be >1). 
While some business enterprises would choose to participate in such a program, because the 
program lies in Region 3, it would be limited to business enterprises that have relatively few 
private-sector R&D partners (particularly startup entrepreneurs), and those business enterprises 
that would participate would treat the program as a substitute for private-sector collaboration and 
therefore reduce the number of their private-sector R&D collaborators.25 
By contrast, if universities are budget-maximizing, they would prefer programs to the southeast 
of the iso-cost curve B 0 , that is, programs located in Region 2 (where business enterprises that 
are already relatively active participants in private-sector collaborative R&D (particularly 
incumbent firms) would choose to participate) or in Region 4 (where a wide variety of business 
enterprises, both incumbent firms and startup entrepreneurs, would choose to participate). In 
either case, the university in this case would act as a complement to private-sector collaborative 
R&D. 
As Coates and Humphreys (2002) and Coates et al. (2004) demonstrate, one can distinguish a 
slack-maximizing bureaucrat from a budget-maximizing bureaucrat by its reaction to grants. In 
the case of a slack-maximizing bureaucrat, a lump-sum grant would not alter its behavior, while 
in the case of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat, such a grant would result in an expansion of its 
program. Although more formal empirical analysis is required, it is our experience that 
universities typically expand their programs when provided with lump-sum grants, thus implying 
that the budget-maximizing model is the more accurate one.26 
Of course, the ability of a budget-maximizing university to offer a program on a iso-cost curve 
such as B 1 orB 2 , and thereby stimulate increased private-sector collaborative R&D among a 
wide array of business enterprises, will depend on the university’s ability to garner grants: the 
larger the grant, the greater ability to offer a program that stimulates private-sector collaborative 
R&D.27 And that ultimately depends on the interests of sponsors, governmental or 
otherwise.,28, 29 
Finally, before turning to normative issues, consider the role that α plays. The value of α may in 
part be exogenously determined by the academic culture within which the program operates. But 
to the extent that αcan be controlled, an α that is closer to one (that is, one in which there is less 
loss of appropriability) will mean that a lower subsidy is required to make a program viable and 
potentially make the program more attractive to a wider range of business enterprises.30 Thus, in 
Fig. 11, a higher α would shift all the iso-cost curves to the right (though the B 0 iso-budget line 
would still cross the δrασ−1=0 line at some point whereδcκ−1>0), thereby reducing the grant that 
the university would have to receive in order to be attractive to business enterprises and to act as 
a complement for private-sector R&D collaboration.31. However, there may be limits to the 
ability to increase α due to constraints imposed by the university’s academic culture and to 
interactions between α and ω. Indeed, to the extent that increased economies of technological 
scope can only come about through increased sharing, this would result in the iso-cost curves 
being steeper. And this would result in it being more costly to attract firms to the program for 
any given ω and κ, and thereby make it more difficult for the university to serve as a complement 
to private-sector R&D collaboration rather than as a substitute for such activity. 
5 Normative considerations 
It is well known that in general the lack of complete appropriability results in business 
enterprises engaging in an inefficiently low level of R&D. Likewise, a well-established finding 
in the bureaucracy literature is that budget-maximizing bureaucrats typically overproduce. 
Together these observations suggest that the two inefficient behaviors would to some extent 
counteract each other so that the participation of universities in the collaborative R&D process 
might result in an improvement in the overall efficiency in the level of R&D reminiscent (this 
time in a public context) of Smith’s invisible hand. 
The creative destruction literature provides some reason to believe that this argument may be 
true.32 Of particular interest is work by Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Howitt and Aghion 
(1998), which argues that creative destruction is likely to result in an inefficiently low level of 
innovation due to a lack of appropriability, intertemporal spillovers, and business-stealing 
effects, but that R&D subsidies can counteract such inefficiencies, particularly those that target 
capital and thereby avoid the agency problems associated with direct R&D subsidies.33 Within 
the context of this article, this argument suggests that university programs properly structured to 
avoid agency problems would indeed improve efficiency. 
6 Conclusions 
To improve our understanding of the role that universities play in facilitating the transmission of 
knowledge to private-sector business enterprises and its conversions to economic, that is, 
commercially viable, knowledge so as to generate economic growth, this article developed a 
formal model of university-with-business enterprise collaborative research partnerships in which 
the outcome was both mutually desirable and feasible, and concluded that if a university seeks to 
act as a complement to private-sector collaborative R&D, it needs to structure its program so that 
business enterprise revenues increase and business enterprise R&D costs rise by a smaller 
proportion than revenues increase, if they rise at all (and a fall would be better). Such a structure 
is consistent with both business enterprise and university interests, but is only likely to be 
feasible if the university is subsidized. In the absence of such support, the university will have to 
cover its costs through a fee charged to participating business enterprises, and this will result in 
the university being seen as a substitute rather than a complement to private-sector collaborative 
R&D and thus as an unattractive partner for many business enterprises. 
A number of additional issues concerning university collaborative research programs remain. 
Perhaps most important is the need to explore the mechanism by which firms choose 
collaborative research partners. As suggested by an anonymous referee, two options are possible 
here. The first option would be to formally model the partnering process using Pissarides’s 
(1990) work on matching in labor markets. The second option would be to characterize business 
enterprises by overlapping knowledge bases with the choice of partners being the result of a 
tension between a desire for greater knowledge spillovers between partners (which would argue 
for less overlap) and a desire for reduced coordination costs between partners (which would 
argue for greater overlap). With either approach, the university would then be characterized by 
its own (perhaps unique) characteristics, and the implications of this for business enterprise 
partnering choice explored. 
A second issue concerns the market environment of business enterprises. This article assumes 
that individual business enterprises act in isolation when deciding whether to participate in 
university programs. However, as Åstebro and Bazzazian (2011) argue, local and regional 
conditions almost surely play a role in the effectiveness of university efforts. To the extent that is 
true, the success of university collaborative research programs may depend on understanding that 
role. 
Finally, several issues remain concerning the university’s funding process. Given the current 
political pressure to reduce governmental deficits in both the USA and Europe, there is reason to 
believe that external public funding is not likely to be forthcoming in the near future. The 
question is whether this conclusion is unique to current circumstances or is a more general 
phenomenon connected to macroeconomic fluctuations. In the absence of Keynesian fiscal 
policies (which seems to be increasingly the case), governments are most likely to support 
university collaborative research programs at the peak of a macroeconomic expansion and least 
likely to support such programs at the bottom of a contraction, thus giving rise to a dynamic 
funding problem for universities. Moreover, as shown in this article, business enterprises are 
attracted to university collaborative research programs to the degree those programs increase 
expected revenues and reduce expected R&D costs for the business enterprise. But it is also true 
that interest rates (which provide the foundation for calculating present values) typically rise as 
the macroeconomy expands and fall as the economy contracts.34 Thus, for a given university 
collaborative research program, and because future revenues associated with collaborative 
research are likely to be more distant than future R&D costs, business enterprises would likely be 
least interested in collaborating with universities at the height of an expansion and most 
interested in collaborating in the depth of a contraction. This then would result in business 
enterprise behavior exacerbating the problem of fluctuating support for university collaborative 
research programs. To the extent this argument is correct (more research would be useful in this 
regard), universities that wish to offer collaborative research programs face a complicated 
dynamic funding and participation problem.35 Of course, one possible solution to the external 
funding problem is for universities to look internally for funds. As noted above in footnote 25, 
universities are complex organizations with a large number of programs and multiple objectives. 
The issue arises, therefore, whether that complexity affects the choices universities make with 
regard to collaborative research program design and support. If the boundaries between various 
university programs are impermeable, there may be little effect of such complexity on the design 
and funding of collaborative research programs. But to the extent there are synergies between 
university programs and fungibility in the funding of those programs, it may be that universities 
may be able to direct support to collaborative research programs internally and therefore may not 
need to depend on external funding as much. 
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Footnotes 
1 Thus, the debate over whether entrepreneurship is essentially a process of creation or discovery 
(Alvarez and Barney 2007) misses the point. As Michelacci (2003) and Acs et al. (2009) argue, 
creation of knowledge by researchers and existing firms and the discovery of such knowledge by 
entrepreneurs are both required. 
2 We abstract from the important impact that universities have through their role in educating 
and graduating students. 
3 Åstebro and Bazzazian (2011), in their wide-ranging review of the empirical literature on the 
impact of universities on local entrepreneurship and economic development, rightly sound a 
cautionary note on our ability to make definitive claims about the causal impact of universities 
on economic development. 
4 See Link and Scott (2005). 
5 See Link and Scott (2007), Layson et al. (2008), Leyden et al. (2008), and Åstebro and 
Bazzazian (2011) for discussions of university research parks. 
6 The Council on Competitiveness (1996, pp. 3–4) recently noted and emphasized this trend in 
the USA: “[P]articipants in the U.S. R&D enterprise will have to continue experimenting with 
different types of partnerships to respond to the economic constraints, competitive pressures and 
technological demands that are forcing adjustments across the board.…[and in response] industry 
is increasingly relying on partnerships with universities ….” Relatedly, Link (1996) showed that 
university participation in formal research joint ventures (RJVs) has increased steadily since the 
mid-1980s, Cohen et al. (1997) documented that the number of industry/university R&D centers 
increased by more than 60 % during the 1980s, and a recent survey of US science faculty by 
Morgan (1998) revealed that many desire even more partnership relationships with industry. 
Mowery and Teece (1996, p. 111) contend that such growth in strategic alliances in R&D is 
indicative of a “broad restructuring of the U.S. national R&D system.” 
7 Hall’s (2004) subsequent emphasis on industry/university research partnerships in the US is on 
intellectual property. See also the role of intellectual property protection mechanisms 
(Hertzfeldet al. 2006). 
 8 Cohen et al. (1997) provide a selective review of this literature, emphasizing the studies that 
have documented that university research enhances firms’ sales, R&D productivity, and 
patenting activity. See Blumenthal et al. (1986), Jaffe (1989), Adams (1990), Berman (1990), 
Feller (1990), Mansfield (1991, 1992), Van de Ven (1993), Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga (1994), 
Klevorick et al. Winter (1995), Zucker et al. (1994), Henderson et al. (1995), Mansfield and Lee 
(1996), Zeckhauser (1996), Campbell (1997), Baldwin and Link (1998), Lee (2000) and Lööf 
and Broström (2008). Cockburn and Henderson (1997) show that it was important for innovative 
pharmaceutical firms to maintain ties to universities. Hall et al. (2000, 2003) suggest that perhaps 
such research ties with universities increase the “absorptive capacity,” in the sense of Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989, 1990), of the innovative firms. This literature is reviewed by Audretsch et al. 
(2012). 
 9 See Berman (1990), Feller (1990), Henderson et al. (1995), Zeckhauser (1996), and Siegel et 
al. (1999). 
 10 GUIRR (2006, p. 8) point out that “Institutional practices and national resources should focus 
on fostering appropriate long-term partnerships between universities and industry.” While we do 
not offer recommendations about such partnerships in this article, we do acknowledge the 
importance of the timing of such relationships and their longevity. However, our model (below) 
is static and does not taking timing into account. Clearly, that is an area for future research. 
 11 Leyden and Link (2013) discuss collective entrepreneurship in the context of the 
management of places. Therein they hypothesize that the strategic management of places is 
functionally related to the collective positive entrepreneurial effort of individuals, each 
exercising his/her perception and action at different time based on their personal preferences, 
expertise, and estimation of the best steps forward. Collectively, they engage in what might be 
called a process of social sequential learning that moves a place forward for the common weal. 
12 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that in a knowledge spillover perspective 
costs and profits are certainly important, as are other intermediary inputs and long-term strategies 
(for example, those that affect regional R&D culture and economic knowledge) that may or may 
not be captured in a static model that focused on costs and profits. We fully agree with this point, 
and we are hopeful that our initial theoretical effort toward collective entrepreneurship will 
provide a foundation for later extensions in the literature to account for these subtleties. 
13 For an interesting antecedent to the KSTE distinction between firms and entrepreneurs, see 
Hébert and Link’s (2009) discussion of Adam Smith’s and Jeremy Bentham’s contrasting views 
of the entrepreneur. 
14 For expository reasons, we reduce the dynamic, uncertain problem of maximizing expected 
profits to a static, deterministic one. See Knight’s (1921) classic work on risk and uncertainty for 
a justification of this approach. 
15 The assumption that potential revenue (and later appropriability and costs) is a function of n is 
a simplifying assumption intended to proxy for the complex matching process by which business 
enterprises identify and partner with other business enterprises in ways that are to the mutual 
advantage to those business enterprises. 
16 Economically usable knowledge includes the results of the entrepreneurial discovery process 
that may result in novel applications of technology and forms of output. 
17 Anand and Khanna (1996) argue that the inability to fully appropriate the value of an 
innovation is due to the presence of weak property rights that arise because of an inability to 
specify the context and boundaries of knowledge in a manner that makes violation of those 
property rights verifiable. Cohen (1994) notes that this inability to fully appropriate the value of 
the research may, if severe enough, lead to incentive problems in engaging in efficient private-
sector collaboration, that is, collaboration that results in more research than would be generated 
in the absence of the collaboration. 
18 There are, of course, markets for human and technical capital, but the nature of R&D in a 
business enterprise is likely to be more focused on the development side and therefore more 
applied and proprietary, while the nature of R&D in a university is likely to be more focused on 
the research side. 
 19 Bozeman et al. (2008) and Leyden et al. (2008) demonstrate this point. 
20 See Baldwin and Link (1998) and Leyden and Link (1999) for empirical analyses based on 
the latter two effects—a reduction in appropriability and a (reduction) in business enterprise 
research costs. Clearly, we are only focusing on university-industry factors that affect costs and 
profits. We acknowledge, as urged by an anonymous referee, that there are other important 
rationales to consider. He/she is correct, but their inclusion is beyond the scope of our model. 
 21 The ensuing discussion assumes that α, ω, and κ are not functions of n. This assumption is 
made for the sake of model clarity. However, we recognize that these parameters may indeed 
vary to some degree with the number of private-sector collaborators. One possibility that is 
plausible and consistent with the conclusions of this article is that the loss in appropriability 
associated with the presence of a university is smaller for incumbent firms (i.e., those that have a 
larger number of private-sector collaborators) than for startup entrepreneurs (i.e., those that have 
a smaller number of private-sector collaborators) so that ∂α/∂n > 0. Likewise, the cost savings 
associated with collaborating with the university is relatively greater for startup entrepreneurs 
than for incumbent firms (i.e., ∂κ/∂n < 0). Of course, the issue is an empirical one and deserving 
of future work. 
22 This is an arc elasticity with the base equal to the level of revenues and costs associated with 
the absence of university collaboration. 
 23 Because nU∗=n∗ when ασ=κ, and because the degree to which nU∗ differs from n∗ is a 
positive, continuous function of the degree to which ασ differs from κ, we can illustrate these 
results in the same change in revenue × change in R&D costs policy space used to summarize 
the conditions under which a business enterprise will choose to collaborate with the university. 
24 Technically, point A lies in Region 1 below the δcκ−1=0 line because α 0 ω < κ (recall 
that ω and κ equal 1 and α 0 is less than 1), which implies nU∗<n∗ (see the discussion following 
Eq. (20)), and nU∗<n∗ implies that δcκ−1<0 (see the discussion following Eq. 15). Intuitively, 
point Alies in Region 1 below the δcκ−1=0 line because the increased loss of appropriability 
(α 0  < 1) results (given no compensating gains in terms of a lower cost function or increase 
prospects for revenue) in participating firms reducing their level of collaboration with other 
business enterprises, and that results in a fall in costs and a (proportionately greater) fall in 
revenues. 
25 If the iso-budget line B 0 were to cross the ασ = κ line, the university could design a balanced-
budget program or even positive-profit program that lies in the upper part of Region 4 in Fig. 11. 
This would still result in a program that essentially charges a fee to participate (κ > 1), though all 
business enterprises would find the program attractive. Those that participated would have an 
incentive to increase the number of private-sector partners. However, because the program would 
be in the upper part of Region 4, this latter incentive would be weak. 
26 See Wyckoff (1990) for a simple comparative static analysis of budget maximization versus 
slack maximization. 
 27 Our analysis assumes that the university program exists in isolation. However, we recognize 
that university objectives are likely more complex with multiple objectives and the possibility for 
fungibility in the funding of multiple programs. Åstebro and Bazzazian (2011), for example, note 
the potential conflict between university efforts to support local startups and university desire for 
licensing revenue, and Ehrenberg, Rees, and Brewer (1993) provide evidence of universities 
using revenues from one program to subsidize others. To the extent universities treat the 
revenues of various programs as fungible, a research program with somewhat higher costs (on 
the iso-cost curve B 1 for example) might be possible without a grant. Initial work on a more 
sophistical model of university objectives suggests that the relative salience to the university of 
its various programs determines the degree to which funding in one program is used to subsidize 
others. 
 28 Breton and Wintrobe (1982) take a more expansive view of bureaucracy by focusing broadly 
on policy decisions rather than technical production decisions. The Niskanen literature, which 
derives from Niskanen (1971) and within which our work fits, focuses on policy as well. 
However, that focus is primarily from a quantitative perspective (such as the quantity to produce) 
and not from a qualitative one, such as what should be produced and what the qualities of that 
output should be. From the perspective of this article, Breton and Wintrobe's work is potentially 
of greater value for understanding the design of a research program, that is, whether it focuses on 
the goals of increasing revenues and reducing costs that are identified in this article and what mix 
(that is where on the iso-cost curve) the program would operate. 
 29 Business enterprise support for universities, to the extent it is motivated by profit 
considerations, is subsumed within the structure of this article’s model. However, as an 
anonymous referee rightly points out, business support for universities may also be motivated by 
more uncertain, dynamic, and longer term considerations such as the development and 
maintenance of relationships, access to future graduates, etc. Such motivations are clearly worthy 
of inquiry but are beyond the scope of this article. 
 30 Åstebro and Bazzazian (2011) in their discussion of university entrepreneurial activity 
suggest that while there are tensions within universities regarding the balance between traditional 
academic and entrepreneurial interests, the culture of some universities has adapted to 
entrepreneurial interests. 
 31 Baldwin and Link (1998) provide empirical evidence that research joint ventures with 
universities tend to be larger than those that do not involve universities and argue that the reason 
for this is that business enterprises in a large research joint venture (because they already have a 
large number of research partners) incur relatively little additional loss of appropriability if they 
also collaborate with a university. Leyden and Link (1999) provide similar evidence and 
argument for research joint ventures involving governmental labs. In terms of the model in this 
article, this suggests that university programs may empirically tend to be located in Region 2 and 
that α may be a positive function of the total number private-sector business enterprises (which 
in Region 2 would primarily be incumbent firms) that choose to collaborate with the university. 
See Cohn et al. (1989) for more general evidence of economies of scope in universities. 
 32 The creative destruction literature traces its origins to Schumpeter (1934). For a discussion of 
Schumpeter’s work on entrepreneurship, the context within which it was developed, and how it 
compares to other theories of entrepreneurship, see Hébert and Link (2009). 
 33 See also Segerstrom and Zolnierek (1999) for an alternative approach. There are two 
extensions of the Aghion and Hewitt argument worth noting. First, Morales (2003) extends that 
argument to the realm of financial capital, arguing that subsidies to financial capital are also 
growth enhancing, though this time because of improved monitoring. Second, Thesmar and 
Thoenig (2000) argue that recent decades (if not the past century) have seen an increase in 
product market volatility and creative destruction that has led to a shift away from fixed capital 
and unskilled labor and toward skilled labor, that is, higher levels of human capital. Such an 
argument suggests that universities, beyond their value in creating skilled workers, may provide 
an important role in acting as matchmaker between skilled workers and firms in the regional 
economy. See Audretsch et al. (2012) for empirical evidence of this connection with respect to 
the use of graduate students. 
 34 A classic description of this pattern can be found in Fisher (1932). 
 35 For evidence of other links between R&D and macroeconomic fluctuations, see Alexopoulos 
(2011). 
 
